Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group

Industrial Capital and Economic Development in Turn of the Century Argentina
Author(s): Michael Johns
Source: *Economic Geography*, Vol. 68, No. 2, Industrial Geography (Apr., 1992), pp. 188-204
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/144201
Accessed: 21-03-2018 04:45 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Economic Geography*

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Industrial Capital and Economic Development in Turn of the Century Argentina*

Michael Johns
Department of Geography, University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720

Abstract: Argentina's economic development at the turn of the century was based on the export of agricultural and pastoral products to western Europe. Although this model generated rapid growth—Argentina was the world's ninth-wealthiest nation in 1910—it failed to develop the institutions and social forces required for a successful adjustment to changing international circumstances beginning in the 1940s. I demonstrate the weakness of Argentina's apparently dynamic turn of the century economy through an examination of the country's industrial capital, which was subordinate to the economic circuits of agrarian rent, merchant's capital, and credit.

Key words: industrial capital, Buenos Aires, Argentina, credit, markets, development.

There was good reason for the heady optimism, even arrogance, that suffused the city of Buenos Aires around the turn of the century. Argentina's capital city commanded an economy that between 1880 and 1920 grew at an annual rate of five percent; experienced a ten-fold increase in foreign trade; became home to over three million immigrants from southern Europe; and absorbed foreign investments that increased from 132 million gold pesos in 1875 to 2,835 million by 1913 (Halsey and Sherwell 1926, 23; Regalsky 1986, 51; Rock 1987, 69). In 1910, Argentina ranked ninth among the world's nations in per capita wealth (Argentina 1917, v.8, 453; Diaz-Alejandro 1985, 98-99). But its highly remunerative position in the world market—it supplied western Europe with grain, wool, and beef and imported virtually everything needed for its economic modernization—did not last. Argentina failed to translate its great wealth and bountiful resources into sustained economic growth once its comparative advantages began to wane.

The protracted decline, since about 1930, of economic growth and political stability in Argentina has puzzled many. Answers to what Felix Weil (1944) called *The Argentine Riddle* generally fall into four camps. One locates the problem in the legacy—of authoritarianism, monopoly, hierarchy, and inflexibility—bequeathed by Argentina's colonial past, a legacy thought to have hindered economic and political modernization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Crassweller 1987; Rock 1987). The real question, however, is why and how these cultural forms, even if one could identify them as causal agents of backwardness, have been reproduced over the last two centuries. A second answer blames the landed oligarchy for monopolizing power and resisting the changes required for a more diversified and agile pattern of economic development (Puiggrós 1965; Scalabrini 1957). This answer, however, relies more on populist resentment than on solid analysis. The oligarchy had relinquished its monopoly of political

* Fernando Rocchi read an earlier version of this paper.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

power by 1912, and though it did firmly control the countryside, it did not single-handedly steer the course of Argentine development. A third analysis condemns foreign capital, in the form of the large export houses, the meatpacking plants, and the railroads and their junior partners, the local landowners, for exploiting the country (Garcia Lupo 1972). This analysis, however, neither clearly specifies nor persuasively argues the mechanisms of exploitation (see Platt 1980; Jones 1980). The fourth answer to the riddle cites Peron's postwar program of import-substitution industrialization and state corporatism. This policy, the argument goes, led to economic inefficiencies and stagnation and thus class tensions that burst the political framework of liberal democracy (Waisman 1987). But this solution does not adequately root specific policies and actors in their historical and social setting.

I argue that industry's poor performance at the turn of the century—manifest in its lack of capital, its inefficiency, and its merchant-like behavior, and caused by Argentina's small and unstable market, a monopolistic and rentier agrarian system, and the competitive edge of European and U.S. industrialists—precluded the development of a more competitive, rigorous, and innovative style of capitalism. The weakness of industrial capital reveals a pattern of economic growth that depended more on the ephemeral and fortuitous combination of the Pampa's extraordinary fertility and favorable international market prices than on the establishment of social forces and institutions capable of sustained economic development over the long haul. Consequently, Argentina encountered serious troubles once its export-oriented agrarian system failed to deliver the huge dividends that for two generations had fueled rapid economic growth and secured political stability.

I account for industry's ancillary status in the Argentine economy and show how that subaltern rank conditioned its logic and operation. In the first section, I outline the Argentine economy and locate industry's subordinate position within it. I then show how Argentina's shallow and unstable market for manufactures and its monopolistic, partisan, and short-term capital market created an industrial sector distinguished by flexible use of unskilled labor, low levels of productivity and innovative capacity, and manufacturers who behaved more like merchants than industrial capitalists. The poor performance of Argentine industry, I argue in conclusion, reveals an economic logic that directed Argentina's most impressive period of growth while simultaneously laying the basis for its subsequent underdevelopment.

The Political Economy of Argentine Development

The key to Argentina's astonishing growth between 1880 and 1920 was the Pampa, an exceptionally fertile region that yielded copious grain harvests and provided pasture for most of Argentina's cattle and about half its horses, sheep, and swine (Tornquist 1919, 29, 345, 260). The Pampa produced most of the nation's exports and provided annual returns of between 10 and 15 percent to its landowners, in addition to a fabulous appreciation of capital that accompanied rising land values and sometimes amounted to several thousand percent in a few decades (Scobie 1964, 50). The Buenos Aires elite monopolized the Pampa. General Roca's "Conquest" of the Pampa's Indians in 1879 opened the region fully to pastoral and agricultural production and was financed in large part by prior land sales. These sales eased the passing of as much as 9 million hectares (21 million acres) into the hands of fewer than 400 persons, primarily landowners and merchants from Buenos Aires, many of whose families had already acquired land in the 1830s and 1840s when dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas gave 7 million hectares (17 million acres) to 235 persons (Cárcano 1925, 82-116; Oddone 1936, 76-98, 119-27,

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

137-50; Lynch 1981, 56-74; Rock 1987, 107-8, 154). The state helped to concentrate this land further by selling most of its newly acquired property to elite families with ties to government officials and access to the state-backed mortgage bonds that fueled the rampant land speculation of the 1880s (Ferns 1960, 370-76; Williams 1920, 75-85). As late as 1914, despite a brisk rural land market, 6 percent of all propertyholders still held almost 70 percent of the Pampa in holdings of over 1,000 hectares (2,400 acres), and some 0.3 percent of all landowners controlled almost one-fifth of the Pampa (Cortes Conde 1979, 149-88; Argentina 1917, V, 3). The lopsided distribution of agrarian wealth reflected this unequal land tenure; between 1900 and 1930, rural rents[1] and profits accounted for about a quarter of Gross Domestic Product, rent grew twice as fast as GDP, and rural "wages" were just 5 percent of GDP, though country folk accounted for 64 percent of the total population in 1914 (Diaz Alejandro 1970, 47-48; Flichman 1982). Rural property, by delivering handsome rents and generous profits and by providing collateral, was the foundation of Argentina's ruling class (Sábato 1988).[2]

[1] Rent, collected from about two-thirds of all producers on the Pampa, ranged from half of the grain harvested by small sharecroppers, who received tools and seeds from the landowner or merchant, to about a fourth of the crop reaped by those who leased sizable plots of land (450 to 1,200 hectares), rented or owned machinery, and hired laborers from among the approximately 250,000 migrants who journeyed each year from southern Italy and Argentine cities for the harvest. Cattlemen, particularly those specializing in fattening, also rented land, though rent played a smaller role in pastoral production.

[2] The Buenos Aires elite was constituted primarily of locally born, landholding families who, until the 1912 reform that gave native-born and naturalized men the vote (only 2 percent of all immigrants were naturalized between 1870 and 1920), exercised monopoly control of the government.

By 1911, Argentina had a per capita foreign trade six times the Latin American average; the Argentine imported over 35 percent of its GDP and exported more than half of its rural production. Buenos Aires controlled three-fourths and one-third of these imports and exports respectively (Buenos Aires 1889, 164-75; Argentina 1916, 178-96; Diaz Alejandro 1970, 210-11). Merchant's capital played a paramount role in this import-export economy. It employed a large percentage of the urban workforce; it hired and owned means of transport and built and rented storage facilities to move and store commodities; and it converted its earnings into credit and consumer demand. The logic of merchant's capital, moreover, dominated the Argentine economy, a short-term and high-liquidity logic that implied a reluctance to invest fixed capital in production.

International loans and the early revenue of the fledgling export sector centered in Buenos Aires Province originally financed the Buenos Aires banks, which began to operate securely only after the state established and guaranteed a single legitimate currency in the early 1880s (Williams 1920, 27-36).[3] The privately owned Banco Nacional (after 1891 the Banco de la Nación) anchored the banking system. It served as the clearinghouse for all banks, issued paper money on the nation's gold holdings (Argentina was on the gold standard from 1880 to 1884 and 1900 to 1914), and offered favorable terms to the state. The Banco de la Nación controlled almost 50 percent of all deposits, and the foreign (usually British) banks, which accounted for only about 2 percent of total direct foreign investment, held

[3] Many who acquired land in the 1870s and 1880s were urban merchants involved in the import-export trade, which grew rapidly in Buenos Aires Province with the expansion of wool production after 1860. Many who pastured sheep and cattle before the 1880s transformed their earnings into urban commercial ventures and credit (Sábato 1984). Landed and merchant's capital fused to become the basis of the city's finance capital.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

less than one-quarter of all bank funds (Ford 1983, 100).[4] The banks obeyed the city's short-term, speculative, and high-liquidity logic. They kept high cash-loan ratios, often greater than 30 percent, and lent usually for 90 and no more than 180 days (Ford 1983, 106). Banking was controlled primarily by landowners and large merchants who were reluctant to lend money to manufacturers.

The industrial capital of Argentina was subordinate to the economic circuits of rent, merchant's capital, and finance. Industrialists had little political power and depended on those in control of the export sector for markets, foreign exchange, and credit. They acted more like merchants than industrialists; they minimized capital investments, operated with short time horizons, and regulated their production by importing products similar to those they manufactured.

The timing of Argentina's entrance into the world market facilitated this arrangement of economic circuits. Around 1880, the Argentine became part of a regular exchange network dominated by the industrial and finance capital of western Europe. The latter's advanced industrial sectors, great demand for beef, grain, and wool, and steamships that delivered industrial commodities to and carried food products from the Argentine made manufacturing virtually unnecessary in Argentina and certainly less profitable than the exploitation of its apparent comparative advantages of extremely fertile land and relatively cheap immigrant labor. But the monopoly control of land by a small rentier class and the consequent building of an agrarian export economy dominated by rent played the critical role in shaping this arrangement of economic circuits. The monopolistic and rentier agrarian system subordinated industrial capital to the circuits of agrarian rent and merchant's and finance capital. It did so, first, I show, by limiting the internal market for locally manufactured goods. Second, it gave great political and economic power to landed and commercial interests, which, through their control of state policy and the banks, did little to favor industrial development. Finally, it encouraged a short-term and high-liquidity investment logic adverse to the development of industrial capital. This investment logic had two major sources. First, the instability inherent in this rapidly growing and highly speculative economy, buffeted by the significant seasonal and yearly swings of its dominant agricultural export sector, proffered all sorts of short-term investment opportunities. Second, local capital markets faced little demand for long-term capital. Industrial goods were easily imported from western Europe and the U.S.; the nation's capital-intensive infrastructure was built and mostly owned by foreign capital (Halsey and Sherwell 1926); and the rental arrangements and rotating land uses that dominated the Pampa checked incentives to invest fixed capital in the countryside. As a result, two cardinal rules governed the economy: (1) maintain maximum capital flexibility by avoiding fixed, long-term investments; and (2) invest in several different economic fields simultaneously.[5]

In sum, the agrarian rent that anchored Argentina's ruling class, the merchant's capital that exported the Pampa's produce and imported European commodities, and the finance capital that enabled the elite to profit from an erratic economy and sustain a monopoly hold on land governed

[4] Foreign capital in land, finance, and insurance companies, however, amounted to almost 30 percent of total foreign investment around 1910, about five times the capital in Argentine banks (Buenos Aires 1915, 173-74; Buenos Aires 1910, I, 194-99).

[5] Few among the elite invested capital for long terms, and though rural property was still a main income earner for most of the elite around 1910, less than one percent of its members were landowners alone (Lloyd 1911, 448-524; Sábato 1988, 203-9). A sample of 100 of the leading entrepreneurs in the important secondary city of Rosario, located on the northern fringe of the Pampa, reveals a similar pattern (Johns 1991).

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

the Argentine economy. These three factors thwarted the formation of a more rigorous economic logic by frustrating the development of a strong manufacturing sector and, consequently, the discipline that a commanding circuit of industrial capital would have imparted to the economy as a whole. Argentina, I show, lacked a consummate industrial capital that disseminated its logic throughout the economy, a logic critical to capitalist development because it demands continuous investments of fixed capital, technological improvements (and thus increases in labor productivity), an accelerated turnover of capital, and greater competitiveness. Argentina's turn of the century capitalism was consequently parasitic, inefficient, and led by a coalition of rentiers, financiers, and merchants who relied on Argentina's truly comparative, if fleeting, advantage in the world market.

The Underdevelopment of Industrial Capital

Buenos Aires housed the overwhelming majority of Argentina's industrial establishments, accounted for the bulk of capital invested in industry, and accommodated most of the nation's industrial workers (Álvarez 1919; Bunge 1940). In 1887, Buenos Aires's 6,000 industrial establishments, 85 of which were large concerns,[6] employed 35,000 persons, or about 18 percent of the city's economically active population; the municipal census recorded an additional 40,000 persons as practicing a "manual art" (Buenos Aires 1889; Dorfman 1970, 211). By 1914, the city's 10,000 manufacturing firms employed 150,000 workers, about 30 percent of the city's labor force (Argentina 1917, v.7, 120, 320). But the rapid growth of industry between 1880 and 1914 did not bring about the development of a truly dynamic circuit of industrial capital; manufacturing in Buenos Aires remained technologically backward, confined to the fabrication of light consumer goods (Table 1), and it never produced more than 15 percent of GDP or supplied more than one-third of the local market for manufactures (Argentina 1917, v.7, 115-20, 313-20; Dorfman 1970, 190-92, 273-321; Diaz-Alejandro 1970, 1-40; Randall 1978, 117).[7]

[6] A large concern in 1887 consumed over 100,000 paper pesos of inputs annually (Buenos Aires 1889). A large outfit in 1919 was capitalized with at least 500,000 paper pesos (Guia 1919).

[7] The manufacturing sectors of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were more competitive than Argentina's. Industrialists in these countries had enough power to get more systematic protection and credit than that given Argentine manufacturers (Denoon 1983, 151-54; Schwartz 1988, 105-63; Kealey 1982, 20-61). Ironically, the Argentine Industrialist

Table 1.

Buenos Aires Industry by Sector, 1914

Sector	Number of Firms	Total Capital	Number of Workers
Food, beverages, and cigarettes	1,603	$137,148,864	25,914
Clothing and leather goods	2,519	$ 91,199,379	38,490
Construction	2,067	$ 62,365,811	23,929
Metallurgy	1,321	$ 48,070,614	16,243
Furniture	1,497	$ 30,471,494	13,979
Graphic and industrial arts	806	$ 26,705,216	9,881
Textiles	157	$ 26,247,305	9,260
Chemicals	159	$ 10,892,605	3,120
Miscellaneous	146	$114,551,460	8,463
Total	10,275	$547,652,248	149,289

Source: Argentina 1917, v.7, 120, 319, 320.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

As a rule, industrialists invested only paltry sums of capital. Consequently, workplaces were usually poorly organized, equipment and machinery were often rudimentary, the putting-out system was used extensively, and labor was a flexible commodity absorbed and released in accord with the significant seasonal and yearly fluctuations that jostled Argentina's rapidly growing but chronically unstable economy. A proponent of the idea of the "scientific organization of work" noted in the 1920s that "Taylorism and the organization of the workplace are just now being discussed in our still incipient industrial sector. Very few apply modern principles of workplace organization . . ." (Hoyo 1922, 8; Dorfman 1970, 329-30).[8]

I first discuss the two major causes of the underdevelopment of industry: Argentina's shallow, unsteady, and unprotected market, and the absence of long-term credit for industry.[9] I then examine three consequences of the shaky market and lack of investment capital: a precarious labor market, low productivity and scant innovative capacity, and manufacturers who behaved more like merchants than industrial capitalists.

The Causes of Industrial Underdevelopment

Argentina's internal market was comparatively small; its population, under 5 million in 1900, would reach 10 million only in the 1920s. More important than the modest size of its market, however, were the distribution and spending of its wealth. The incomes of rural workers such as grain producers, wool shearers, grape growers, and sugar harvesters, though higher than those of rural folk elsewhere in Latin America, were much lower than their counterparts' in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Apart from some early, small-scale development of private property in the northernmost reaches of the Pampa, the inequitable and tenant-based agrarian system failed to produce anything like the farmer classes that developed in other grain-, beef-, or wool-producing countries (Gallo 1984).[10] Exorbitant rents, rental contracts rarely longer than three years, and usurious interest rates translated into rural living standards far below those in the American Midwest, the Canadian Prairies, and the countrysides of Australia and New Zealand (Platt and DiTella 1979; Schwartz 1989). Capital improvements and the use of machinery on the Pampa were also comparatively rare. The rental system and its short tenures, the shifting of land use every few years between grains and pasture in many regions of the Pampa, and the high yields afforded by the Pampa's extraordinary fertility dampened incentives to make improvements. Total net investment in agriculture between 1900 and 1904 probably declined, between 1905 and 1909 grew by just 2.1

Union (UIA) thought that patterning social legislation (e.g., credit for farmers, land redistribution, voting rights, labor legislation) upon that of Australia and New Zealand, which the UIA regarded as "classic examples of state socialism," would be disastrous (Sharkey 1977, 203).

[8] The foreign-owned meatpacking plants were the only factories before 1930 to create strong divisions of labor within the plant and routinize and de-skill most of the labor process (Lobato 1988, 13).

[9] Several other factors shaped the organization and operation of industrial capital. International competition was an obvious one, but its impact was primarily to preempt the development of capital goods production, highly developed in the U.S. and Europe, and, owing to the need for large markets, huge investments of capital, and state aid, finding little incentive to locate in Argentina. I want to show why the industrial capital that did develop did not do so in a more consummate fashion.

[10] Argentina's monopolistic and rentier agrarian system sets its development apart from that of Canada, Australia, and even New Zealand, each of which became tightly incorporated into the world market at about the same time, the 1870s or so, and in much the same way, through the export of grains and animal products, as Argentina (Denoon 1983, 82-83, 101-7; Sinclair 1969, 181; Platt and DiTella 1985; Schwartz 1989, chs. 2 and 3).

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

percent, and between 1910 and 1914 increased by only around 2 percent. Most of this capital went for the purchase of land itself rather than for land improvement or machinery (Randall 1978, 90-91, 87; Scobie 1964, 89-163; Schwartz 1989, 145).

The rents accruing to the Buenos Aires elite constituted as much as one-quarter of Argentina's GDP. The elite spent a significant portion of these rents on manufactured goods from, in order of importance, Britain, Germany, the U.S., France, and Italy (Randall 1978, 215; Diaz-Alejandro 1970, 47-48). The elite's ardent desire to prove its cosmopolitan stature translated into a fetishism of foreign goods (Scobie 1974, ch. 6). Local industrialists thus stood little chance of supplying the elite's demand for manufactures, even if they could have produced quality goods competitively. The low incomes of the urban working classes, who constituted about three-fourths of the urban population and earned about one-half the wages of workers in England and one-fifth those in the U.S., also contributed to the weakness of the market for locally manufactured goods (Panetierri 1982, 72-73). High urban land rents further reduced the effective demand of urban wages, as did the unsystematic import tariffs, which afforded industry little protection but did finance the government at the cost of increasing the prices of imported goods.

This small domestic market was also highly unstable, in large part because of the seasonal rhythms of wool shearing, grain harvesting,[11] beef processing, and such related activities as rail, storage, and port operations. Consequently, the profits, rents, and labor markets of most agrarian-related outfits, and thus urban construction, manufacturing, and commercial activities, oscillated sharply throughout the year (Clark 1918, 43; Gravil 1975, 370; Cortes Conde 1979, 199-209; Diaz-Alejandro 1970, 27). Annual changes in the yields and prices of exports dictated both the nation's import capacity, which was a function of the trade balance and the availability of hard currency, and the strength of the domestic market, which fluctuated along with profits, rents, and wages (Williams 1920, 12-13). Dependence on the export sector also translated into unpredictable government revenues and the stop-go nature of public works projects (Cortes Conde 1979, 202). Significant was the:

> remarkable elasticity displayed by . . . fiscal resources. . . . Here, more than in any country, the official revenues are in direct relation to the result of the harvests and the exportation of the products of the ranch; . . . the table of fiscal receipts is a kind of infallible barometer, which measures the degree of wealth and prosperity of the . . . population (Martinez and Lewandowski 1915, 309).

Inconsistent tariff rates made the market even less predictable. Free trade formed the centerpiece of the elite's economic strategy. The financial needs of the government (which was funded by import tariffs rather than export taxes), the consumer preferences of the elite, and the profit requirements of importers thus determined tariffs. Before 1906, tariffs were subject to annual changes; one year's tariff might be reduced or abolished the next.[12] For manufacturers, predictability of operation and thus planning were virtually impossible. The Argentine In-

[11] As late as 1916, tens of thousands left Buenos Aires each year for several months of agricultural work. Perhaps 200,000 Italians performed several months of harvest labor each year between the late 1880s and 1910s, returning to Italy with a good portion of their wages (Cortes Conde 1979, 240-70).

[12] Even the 1906 tariff reform, which stipulated that tariffs could be changed only every three years, offered little help. Tariffs were levied on *aforas*, or official assessments of value, rather than market prices. These official assessments did not increase after 1906, and by 1919 they were only 35 percent of market value (Randall 1978, 120; Sharkey, 1977, 162-73).

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

dustrial Union (UIA) noted the dilemma posed by tariff duties subject to annual changes announced only at the moment they took effect. Manufacturers, the UIA complained, could not halt operations in a moment of uncertainty and await resolution of the new schedule. Nor could they continue producing and accumulating inventory only to discover that it must be sold at a loss if the tariff duty on the imported equivalent fell the next year (Sharkey 1977, 95-101, 153).[13]

The general absence of long-term investment capital was the second factor directly hindering the development of the productive forces in industry. It was also a key reason for the foreign control of almost half (48 percent) of Argentina's total fixed capital (Diaz-Alejandro 1970, 30). Flexibility was the watchword of the Buenos Aires capitalist (Sábato 1975, 75, 79). To tie up capital in this erratic economy was dangerous and meant foregoing the many lucrative, quickly arising, and ephemeral profit opportunities available in land speculation, construction, the import-export business, moneylending, and so on. This short-term, maximum-liquidity, and high-flexibility logic meant the absence of long-term financing.[14] As it was, the mostly Italian industrialists faced great difficulty in obtaining even short-term credit from the native, rentier, and cliquish elite that controlled the banks.[15] Neither did the stock market provide capital for industry; industrial firms accounted for just 5 percent of the firms quoted on the Buenos Aires stock exchange (Dorfman 1970, 307). Except for a few well established outfits with access to local branches of foreign banks, or the largest industrialists with connections to European capital markets, the vast majority of manufacturers found credit to be short-term, available from merchants only, and very expensive. Many industrialists relied on revenues as the sole source of fresh investment capital (Dorfman 1970, ch. 5; Guy 1982, 356; Fraboschi 1963, 156-57; Scarzanella 1981, 151). The establishment of a sound and accessible credit system is an exacting task for any country. This task was:

> especially [difficult] in Argentina. Many undertakings based on sound business projects have failed for lack of funds to keep them going until they are established. Factory industries cannot be initiated without the necessary financial support to permit economy of production, since it is on that basis that they must compete with the imported articles. Up to the present the tremendous growth of agricultural and stockraising industries yielding relatively prompt and large profits has absorbed nearly all the surplus capital in Argentina (Brock 1919, 45).

Clearly, this circuit of interest-bearing capital, which industry had not subordinated to its requirements, served the seasonal, speculative, and short-term needs of the nation's rentier ruling class:

> Most of the banks operate on the methods of the last century. They buy money at the best price they can and sell with a margin of profit to commence at 90 and 180 days . . . There is no financing of the creative forces.

[13] Tariffs in Argentina were well below those in the U.S., Canada, or most of Europe (Randall 1978, 204; Kealey 1982, 20-61; Hobsbawm 1987, chs. 2 and 3; Lash and Urry 1987, chs. 2 and 3). Though the role of industry was debated during the crisis of the mid-1870s, tariff protection and other aid for industry were out of the question by the early 1880s (Álvarez 1919, 86-87; Chiaramonte 1971, 91-120). Even the Socialist Party defended free trade (Walter 1977, 86; Panettieri 1983, 57-68; Platt 1972, 82, 84, 192; Álvarez 1919, 93).

[14] There was not even an internal market for medium- and long-term government securities in Argentina. The elite preferred more lucrative and shorter-term investments (Peters 1934, 62-64).

[15] Foreigners, mainly Italians, owned about three-fourths of Argentina's industrial capital between 1900 and 1914 (Randall 1978, 126). On the credit market, see Hurley (1914, 31), Bunge (1929, 95), Williams (1920, 74), Ford (1983, 106) and Guy (1984).

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

> They are not issuing-banks serving the governments, municipalities or industries (Bunge 1929, 95).[16]

The small and erratic market and the lack of credit translated into the three major features of Argentine industrial capital, which I take up in turn: the flexible use of labor, low levels of efficiency, and manufacturers who behaved more like merchants than industrialists.

The Consequences of Industrial Underdevelopment

Labor was truly a variable factor of production. A U.S. Commerce Department (1920, 10) investigator noted the high rate of seasonal unemployment in Buenos Aires and was surprised to learn that even skilled industrial laborers were often unemployed for several months of the year. Juan Alsina, in his classic study of the workers of Buenos Aires, found that:

> the workers in factories and workshops are usually day workers who, without any definite skills or job description, learn a job quickly. These are highly mobile workers earning minimum wages, able to perform several tasks and transfer to other jobs rapidly; they even leave their city jobs for five to six months to work in the countryside shearing wool or harvesting grain (Alsina 1905, 43).

Alsina's description of the labor market illustrates a leading strategy of industrialists: minimize investments of fixed capital and adjust the size of the workforce to market conditions. The two large manufacturers of burlap bags, for example, trebled their normal workforces to about 1,000 during the grain harvest. Depending on demand and the availability of inputs, the Casimiro Gomez tannery employed between 1,000 and 3,000 unskilled laborers. The number of workers in foreign-owned meatpacking plants fluctuated seasonally between 1,000 and 2,000 (*La Nación* 1916, 106; Lloyd 1911, 452, 486-87; Bergquist 1987, ch. 3). The constant threat of market fluctuations meant that a long-term increase in market size, even in the relatively stable clothing and textile industries, usually led to a quantitative expansion of existing conditions rather than the purchase of new and more productive machinery (*La Nación* 1910, 166). In this way, the firm retained the option of adjusting to short-term market changes by hiring and firing workers.

The putting-out system represented another method for reducing fixed costs and using labor flexibly. The enormous retail houses Gath y Chaves, Harrods, A La Ciudad de Londres, Cibrian, and A La Ciudad de Mexico, all of which manufactured many of the clothes they sold, employed over five times their permanent sweatshop employees by putting out work to mostly female homeworkers. The several large clothing factories that each employed hundreds of workers on site also put work out to thousands of employees on a piecework basis (Guia 1919, 238-47; *La Nación* 1916, 66-67, 100-101, 186-87; Lloyd 1911, 452, 462; Clark 1918, 123; Argentina 1907, 323-24, 328). Together, the large retail houses and the clothing factories employed over 10,000 in their clothing workshops and put out work to at least 50,000 more (Lloyd 1911, 462; *La Nación* 1910, 74-75, 186-87).[17] The

[16] The Banco Tornquist and the Banco de Italia y Rio de La Plata, the only major banks that loaned to industrial operations, exercised considerable leverage over the operations they funded, often owning controlling interests, making critical investment and organizational decisions, and even taking over companies and merging them with others (Lewis 1990, 65-68).

[17] This figure corresponds with the usual estimate of between 60,000 to 80,000 homeworkers for the post-1900 period, a quarter of whom were sewing together shoes (Panettieri 1982, 82-86; Argentina 1913, 779). These high numbers find further corroboration in the city's 1910 and the nation's 1914 census listings of "manual art" occupations, which enumerate over 50,000 persons with job titles such as

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

shoe industry also used the putting-out system heavily. A U.S. Commerce Department inspector noted that:

> there is not a [shoe] factory that performs all the upper preparations within the factory . . . [In addition] to giving out uppers . . . to women to be taken home for stitching, which is the practice in the majority of Argentine factories, many uppers are stitched in special "talleres" or shops . . . and several wholesale houses selling shoe supplies and leather, also stitch uppers for sale to small factories where the bottoming operations are performed by hand (Brock 1919, 51-52).

Industrialists could adjust the size of their workforces, and thereby limit their investments of fixed capital, despite the city's generally tight labor market. Manufacturers often complained of labor shortages, especially before 1910, and workers moved from sector to sector and from city to countryside with some freedom (Argentina 1916, 339).[18] Though real wages do not seem to have risen significantly across the board between the 1880s and 1910s,[19] the tight labor market should have induced industrialists to make investments to reduce their need for labor. But the cyclical nature of the market, industrialists' lack of credit and scant political power,[20] and the unskilled nature of most work[21] reduced the negotiating power of workers[22] as well as incentives to invest fixed capital.

The second consequence of the shallow market and lack of long-term credit was an industrial capital that was inefficient, unable to produce high-quality goods, and lacking in innovative capacity. The tanneries, for example, failed to produce fine-grade leather, which was in great demand in Argentina and abroad. Martinez and Lewandowski (1915, 244) noted that tanning:

> ought in time to occupy a place of far greater importance than it does now; for the raw materials—hides and quebracho, the best of tanning media, are present in abundance. To understand the stationary condition of this industry we must remember that it would require a considerable spare capital, as the hides have to remain in the vats for several months, during which time the tanner has need of capital at low terms of interest, which up to the present

seamstress, cloth cutter, embroiderer, dressmaker and tailor, several times the number employed in factories (Argentina 1917, v.7, 313-14; Buenos Aires 1910, 53-56).

[18] Strike activity was highest at the height of the agricultural season when ports, railroads, and many urban industries were operating at full tilt and the labor market was tight, owing in part to the tens of thousands of workers who abandoned the city for seasonal agricultural labor (Pianetto 1984).

[19] The issue of wage levels between 1880 and 1914 is still unsettled (Cortes Conde 1979, 211-20; Gutiérrez 1983).

[20] In 1908, only 10 of 120 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 3 of 30 members of the Senate were engaged primarily in manufacturing (Sharkey 1977, 67-68). And, as we will see, industrialists had very little collective influence on state policy.

[21] Lacking were operations that required skilled labor, such as machine-tool shops or sophisticated metallurgical firms. The development of industries that after 1880 began to use light equipment and more routinized labor processes ruined most craft producers and reduced skill levels in such important industries as clothing, shoe, and cigarette production.

[22] Some factories with large and more or less permanent workforces, such as the Bagley cracker and biscuit factory, the several large metalworking shops, and the mostly foreign-owned meatpacking plants, were susceptible to union organization. But the best organized sectors of the working class were the port and railroad workers, who held critical posts in the export system. These workers confronted foreign capital and the state, not local industrialists. The working class and the middle-class Socialist Party recognized industry's dependence on the export sector and advocated free trade. On Argentina's turn of the century working class, see Falcón (1986) and Godio (1987).

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

time has not been available in the Argentine.

Furniture shops also faced capital shortages and tended to employ carpenters who crafted pieces of furniture individually and in complete form (Romero and Sábato 1986/7, 125-50). Furniture makers could not afford to purchase equipment to organize their shops better and improve productivity:

> Many of the men interested [in improving their shops] are poor and unable to purchase modern machinery and stocks of supplies, or to manufacture in quantities to their own advantage. [Consequently,] very little machine work is done except roughing out the stock. . . . Modern machines such as those for gluing and sanding, and other labor saving devices, are not used, and the hand labor done is considerable and costly (Everley 1919, 24-25).

The small size and erratic nature of the market preempted the development of heavy industry. They also thwarted the development of a machine-tool sector: "it is impossible to consider the manufacture of machinery in Argentina as of any importance, for the simple reason that, although the machinery might be made, it is not worth while to turn out only two or three machines after preparing the moulds; and as there would be no market for a greater quantity those required by the country continue to be imported" (Worthington [1899] 1980, 60). Metalworking shops, though technologically backward compared to U.S. and European outfits, required more fixed capital and had a slower turnover than most other Argentine industries. The absence of long-term credit thus hampered them particularly. The lack of capital limited the machine shops to general repair work and the manufacture of simple things, usually for the railroads and public works projects, that did not require special tools or skill. Only two foundries made steel castings, and neither was of great importance (Massel 1916, 24, 35; Dorfman 1970, 291-300). Capital shortage kept Fontana, a large metallurgical firm at the end of the century, from increasing its technical capacity and entering new niches; as a result, it went bankrupt (Schvarzer 1983). Credit shortages also hindered the local production of the tin cans and boxes used for general packaging. Lacking the capital to manufacture finished products from imported tin, the two producers operating in the 1910s simply reworked imported tin plate and cans (Helguera 1893, 20; Archivo Bagley). The absence of long-term capital for the metallurgical sector translated into inefficiency and an inability to supply the market; in 1913, local firms met only 12 percent of the domestic market for metal goods (Dorfman 1970, 310).

The organization of production in the shoe factories baffled foreign observers. Though these factories did have specific work stations organized around routine and detailed tasks, they had no departmental divisions by size, style, or gender. Nor did they have standardized production runs; equipment was constantly retooled and, along with personnel, continuously rearranged to adjust to the rapidly fluctuating markets (*La Nación* 1916, 313; González 1986, 98). Some shoe producers took advantage of the facilities offered by the United Shoe Machinery Co., which, through its leased-machine system, reduced the obstacle formed by the scarcity of capital to the acquisition of more sophisticated equipment (Brock 1919, 46).[23]

We saw above that the putting-out and sweatshop systems, which employed "women, children, semiskilled workers, and unemployed intellectuals with no skills at all," afforded the requisite agility and liquidity to operate in the volatile

[23] Argentine shoes, though not as durable as U.S. imports, did exhibit a "nicety of finish." By 1914, local production covered most of the domestic market, and by 1918 local products competed with U.S. imports for a part of the high-quality women's market (Lloyd 1911, 190; *La Nación* 1916, 313; Brock 1919, 45-46).

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

clothing market (Sofer 1982, 101). But these systems, according to a U.S. Commerce Department observer, prevented the "thorough organization or forced speed production" required "for uniformity of design or finish [and were] one of the reasons for the low status of the merchandise" (Clark 1918, 123). Only a few of the more than 100 textile firms that developed after 1900 were "worthy of the name of mills or are serious factors in a commercial way" (Garry 1920, 23, 30). In 1914, only seven operated with a capital greater than $500,000 (paper pesos). Imported cloth and fabrics exceeded local production in value by about seven times (Garry 1920, 23, 30). Scarce credit and the lack of cotton production, despite prime conditions in the country's northeast, hindered the development of what should have been a "natural industry" (Platt 1972, 85, 95, 182).

In sum, the erratic market and lack of capital, which limited fixed investments and encouraged industrialists to adjust the size of their workforces to the perpetually unstable market, resulted in inefficiency and poor quality. As a general rule, Argentine industrialists, no matter what they produced, manufactured "the simple and coarser classes of goods" (Balfour 1925, 11, 13, 468; Platt 1972, 82, 91, 97).

The unstable markets and lack of investment capital subordinated Buenos Aires industries to merchant's capital. In the clothing sector, for example, the seamstress who had sewed at home and on an individual contract basis in the 1880s gave way to a merchant-controlled and machine-aided production process based on a deepening division of labor and carried out in sweatshops and via the putting-out system. The number of seamstresses began to decline in the late 1880s, a trend that would accelerate throughout this period, while the numbers of embroiderers, dressmakers, cutters, and buttonholers grew rapidly (Romero and Sábato 1986/7, 131-32; Korzeniewicz 1989, 81-85). By 1900, most clothiers were "of the workshop or sweatshop type, which buy their raw materials from the wholesaler or even from the retailer, according to the importance of their trade" (Garry 1920, 17). These outfits, owing to "the limited capital with which they operate, [must] dispose of the goods and collect for them before they can square their accounts" (Clark 1918, 23). Merchants so thoroughly controlled the inputs and markets of smaller producers that the latter became virtually "homeworkers" for the former (Garry 1920, 16; Sofer 1982, 104). And the largest producers were the huge retail stores that forged backward links into manufacturing primarily via the putting-out system, a classic case of merchant's capital entering the realm of production not by investing fixed capital, but by controlling credit, inputs, and markets. In the shoe industry, the lack of long-term credit precluded shoemakers from producing in standard batches and holding inventory, thereby affording wholesalers and retailers, who exercised significant control over credit, inputs, and markets, a strong grip on the production process itself (*La Nación* 1916, 313).

Most large manufacturers were not consummate industrial capitalists. They were, instead, merchant-industrialists. Industrialists often manufactured the lower grades (we saw above that quality was generally poor) and imported the finer versions of the same commodity. The large retail houses, for example, which used their sweatshops and putting-out arrangements to manufacture lower-quality items, obtained large orders of the latest and highest-quality goods through their buying houses in Paris, London, New York, Manchester, Lyon, and Philadelphia (*La Nación* 1916, 59). Even the six largest metallurgical plants and the three most important agricultural implements firms, which performed minor production, assembly, and repair work, imported items that they also produced (Massel 1916; von Motz 1916, 78; Lloyd 1911, 448, 482; Guia 1919, 12-14, 18-19). Large Argentine industrialists, no matter what they produced, tended to manufacture the simpler and import the finer items

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

(Balfour 1925, 11, 13, 468; Platt 1972, 97).[24] Dozens of large industrial firms imported different, though related, products. The outfit of Kulcke and Frankel, for instance, which produced shirts and ties, imported all manner of menswear. The agricultural implements firms also imported equipment and machinery that they did not assemble locally. Other firms imported commodities that had no relation to those they produced, such as the firm Gratry, which produced textiles and imported construction materials (Lloyd 1911, 452, 460; von Motz 1916, 78). As a general rule, then, the large industrialists were simultaneously merchants, usually importing higher-quality versions of the goods they produced, though many times importing distinct though complementary products and frequently handling commodities of a completely different sort. The need to work with maximum flexibility in a highly erratic economy dictated this strategy. Such an economy did not favor the development of a consummate and strictly industrial capital, that is, one that invests fixed capital to increase its productivity, efficiency, and innovative capacity.

The lack of a true circuit of industrial capital and a cohesive group of industrial capitalists was manifest in the contradictory attitudes of large manufacturers regarding the protection of the domestic market (Cúneo 1984, 90-178). Because they simultaneously produced and imported, industrialists did not have a general interest in tariffs per se. If, for example, tariff policy appeared threatening to the local production of a particular article, the manufacturers producing that item would protest individually, without attempting to enlist the aid of their associates. Nor did those producing one product consider plans of reciprocal assistance with those producing other goods (Sharkey 1977, 24). Each industrialist attempted to advance his interests by lobbying individually for duties on those products he produced (Platt 1972, 82, 84; Sharkey 1977, 24, 25). An observer wrote in 1919 that

> individual industrialists are always lobbying in the congresssional chambers, the Department of Public Finances, the Office of Revenues . . . behind the numerous petitions are personal contacts, fraud, and deceit. It is critical to be close by, within reach of a telephone, to assure that your effort to affect the annual revisions in tariff policy is successful (Álvarez 1919, 94).

Industrialists required political contacts, for "what security can an industrialist have," asked Juan Álvarez, "who is without political influence, given that variations in yearly tariff policy can range from 50 to 200%?" (Álvarez 1919, 91).

The economy's erratic nature, then, and industry's subordination to the circuits of agrarian rent and merchant's and finance capital induced manufacturers to operate simultaneously as merchants and industrialists. This contradictory position was manifest in the individualized strategies of producers to affect tariff policy, and it impeded the development of a class consciousness among manufacturers (Cúneo 1984, 54-76; Sharkey 1977, 179-237).

Merchant's capital in turn of the century Buenos Aires, as Marx observed of Europe more than a century earlier, had the "fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists," which it occasionally did through its control of markets and credit, "but to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner," which it did by reducing incentives to invest fixed capital (Marx 1968, 245). A debate in 1914 between Congressman Enrique Dickman and the Union of Argentine Industrialists

[24] An exception was the Bianchetti company, which manufactured the industrial scales required by railroad, cattle, and grain operations. This company "has not limited itself to reproducing foreign models, but has introduced models in accord with the particular needs of national commercial and industrial outfits" (*La Nación* 1910, 46; *La Nación* 1916, 163).

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

betrays the underdeveloped, subordinate, and merchant-dominated status of the city's industrial capitalists. Dickman argued that an eight-hour workday, among other concessions to workers, would stimulate technological change and thereby increase industrial productivity. The Union responded, with reason: "with what science, with what experience, with what capital will we realize such a miracle?" (cited in Cúneo 1984, 71).

Conclusion: The Underdevelopment of Argentina

Industrial capital, which assumed control of the overall production and circulation of commodities in the advanced capitalist nations by the late nineteenth century, was critical to the development of a robust and agile form of capitalism capable of adjusting to changing market circumstances and thereby performing adeptly throughout the twentieth century. Without a strong circuit of industrial capital, an economy employs less labor, produces less value, imports more, and is unable to export manufactured commodities. More importantly, the proper logic of accumulation remains underdeveloped, a logic oriented toward increasing the productivity of labor, achieving higher levels of competitiveness, and imposing the discipline of industrial capital on the circuits of merchant's and interest-bearing capital so that they work for, and do not control, the real production of commodities. Industry's inferior rank in Argentina—manifest in its lack of capital, its inefficiency, and its merchant-like behavior, and caused by Argentina's small and unstable market, a monopolistic and rentier agrarian system, and the competitive edge of European and U.S. industrialists—prevented it from developing and disseminating the logic of a more competitive and rigorous capitalism.

This failure to develop a more competitive circuit of industrial capital had serious long-term consequences. Although Buenos Aires at the turn of the century had its excellence—boasting one of the world's richest elites, the strongest middle class and highest-paid working class in Latin America, and outstanding urban services—it was an ephemeral excellence based on the economic triad of a parasitic circuit of rent, an inefficient circuit of merchant's capital, and an exclusive and usurious circuit of interest-bearing capital. This triad, highly rewarding while Argentina enjoyed an unparalleled comparative advantage in the world market, thwarted the development of industrial capital and could not lay the basis for a truly resourceful and productive economy. If this monopolistic and rentier economy fostered a temporary excellence in the realm of consumption, it encouraged a lasting mediocrity in the more critical sphere of production.

This mediocrity was clearly manifest by the 1940s, when a state-induced industrialization scheme based on the import-substitution model entrained a bloated government sector, parasitic unions, industrial inefficiency, and protracted and often bloody social struggles. Some have argued that late industrialization may be advantageous (Gerschenkron 1962). But the exaggerated lateness of Argentine industrialization was certainly a liability. Argentina lacked the requisite institutions (e.g., engineering, a sound finance system, manufacturing experience) for successful industrialization. Its industrial class required, and has been unable to wean itself from, state tutelage. Its short-term economic logic, which once orchestrated a dynamic and profitable system, has proven disastrous for industrial development. The answer to the riddle of Argentine development, then, is that, paradoxically, the political and economic logic that fueled one of the world's most impressive periods of economic growth simultaneously laid the basis for subsequent underdevelopment.

References

Alsina, J. 1905. *El obrero en la República Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Álvarez, J. 1919. *Buenos Aires*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.

Archivo Bagley. Various years. *Actas del directores*. Buenos Aires: Bagley Co.

Argentina No. 3, Dic. 1907. *Boletín del Departamento Nacional del Trabajo*. Buenos Aires: Tallers Graficos A. de Matino.

Argentina No. 25, Dic. 1913. *Boletín del Departamento Nacional del Trabajo*. Buenos Aires: Tallers Gráficos A. de Matino.

Argentina, Departamento Nacional del Trabajo. 1916. *Anuario estadística del trabajo, 1914*. Buenos Aires: Tallers Gráficos A. de Matino.

Argentina. 1917. *Tercer censo nacional 1914*. Buenos Aires: Commision Nacional del Censo.

Balfour, A. 1925. *Survey of overseas markets*. London: Dent and Sons.

Bergquist, C. 1987. *Labor in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Brock, H. 1919. *Boots, shoes, leather and supplies in Argentina*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Special Agent Series 177.

Buenos Aires. 1889. *Censo de la Municipalidad de Buenos Aires de 1887*. Buenos Aires: Tallers Gráficos A. de Matino.

———. 1910. *Censo General de la Municipalidad de Buenos Aires 1909*. Buenos Aires: Tallers Gráficos A. de Matino.

———. 1915. *Anuario estadística de la ciudad de Buenos Aires*. Buenos Aires: Tallers Gráficos A. de Matino.

Bunge, A. 1929. Two billions in savings accounts: Its economic significance. *Review of Argentine Economics* 13 (128): 93-100.

———. 1940. *Una nueva Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Hyspamerica.

Cárcano, M. 1925. *El régimen de la tierra pública*. Buneos Aires: La Facultad.

Chiaramonte, J. 1971. *Nacionalismo y liberalismo económico, 1860-1880*. Buenos Aires: Solar Hachette.

Child, T. 1902. *The Spanish American republics*. Boston: Morse and Co.

Clark, L. 1918. *Wearing apparel in Argentina*. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Miscellaneous Series 68.

Cortes Conde, R. 1979. *El progreso Argentino: la formación del mercado nacional, 1880-1910*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.

———. 1986. The growth of the Argentine economy, c.1870-1914. In *The Cambridge history of Latin America*, ed. L. Bethell, pp. 67-98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crassweller, R. 1987. *Perón and the enigmas of Argentina*. New York: Norton.

Cuneo, D. 1984. *Comportamiento y crisis de la clase empresaria*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.

Denoon, D. 1983. *Settler capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Diaz-Alejandro, C. 1970. *Essays on the economic history of the Argentine Republic*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

———. 1985. Argentina, Australia and Brazil before 1929. In *Argentina, Australia and Canada*, eds. D.C.M. Platt and G. DiTella, pp. 92-119. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Dorfman, A. 1970. *Historia de la industria argentina*. Buenos Aires: Solar Hachette.

Everley, H. 1919. *Furniture markets of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay*. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Special Agent Series 183.

Ewing, W. 1920. *Construction materials and machinery in Argentina*. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Special Agents Series 188.

Falcon, R. 1986. *El mundo de trabajo urbano, 1890-1914*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.

Ferns, H.S. 1960. *Britain and Argentina in the nineteenth century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Flichman, G. 1982. *La renta del suelo y el desarrollo agrario argentino*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.

Ford, A.G. 1983. *The gold standard, 1880-1914: Britain and Argentina*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fraboschi, R. 1966. Industria y comercio. In *Historia contemporánea Argentina*, Vol. 11, pp. 127-268. Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional.

Gallo, E. 1984. *La pampa gringa*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.

Garcia Lupo, R. 1972. *Mercenarios y monopolios en la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Legasa.

Garry, L. 1920. *Textile markets in Argentina*. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Special Agents Series 194.

Gerschenkron, A. 1962. *Economic backwardness in historical perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Godio, J. 1987. *El movimento obrero argentino, 1870-1910*. Buenos Aires: Omnibus.

González, R. 1986. *Los obreros y el trabajo: Buenos Aires, 1901*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.

Gravil, R. 1975. El comercio minorista británico en la Argentina 1900-1940. In *El régimen oligarcha*, ed. M.Giménez Zapola, pp. 108-32. Buenos Aires: Omnibus.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

———. 1919. *Guia del comercio mayorista de la República Argentina, Uruguay y Paraguay*. Buenos Aires.

Gutiérrez, L. 1983. Los trabajadores y sus luchas. In *Buenos Aires: historia de cautro siglos*, eds. J.L. Romero and L.A. Romero, pp. 562-75. Buenos Aires: Editorial Abril.

Guy, D. 1979. Carlos Pellegrini and the politics of early Argentine industrialization, 1873-1906. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 11: 123-44.

———. 1982. La industria argentina, 1870-1940. Legislación comercial, mercado de acciones y capitalización extranjera. *Desarrollo Económico* 22 (87):351-74.

———. 1984. Dependency, the credit market, and Argentine industrialization, 1860-1940. *Business History Review* 58: 532-61.

Halsey, F., and Sherwell, G. 1926. *Investments in Latin America: Argentina*. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce Bulletin 362.

Helguera, D. 1893. *La producción Argentina en 1892*. Buenos Aires: Peuser.

Hobsbawm, E. 1987. *The age of empire*. New York: Pantheon.

Hoyo, A. 1922. *La organización científico del trabajo y al producción y el problema obrero*. Buenos Aires: Peuser.

Hurley, E. 1914. *Banking and credit in Argentina*. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Special Agents Series 90.

Jefferson, M. 1926. *Peopling the Argentine Pampas*. New York: American Geographical Society.

Johns, M. 1991. The urbanisation of a secondary city: The case of Rosario, Argentina, 1880-1920. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23: 489-513.

Jones, C. 1980. "Business imperialism" and Argentina, 1875-1900: A theoretical note. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12: 437-44.

Kealey, G. 1982. Toronto's industrial revolution, 1850-1892. In *Canada's age of industry*, eds. M. Cross and G. Kealey, pp. 20-61. Toronto: McLelland and Stuart.

Korzeniewicz, R. 1989. Labor unrest in Argentina, 1887-1907. *Latin American Research Review* 24 (3):118-34.

La Nación. 1910. *Edición aniversario de la Revolución de Mayo*. Buenos Aires: La Nación.

———. 1916. *Edición aniversario de la Independencia*. Buenos Aires: La Nación.

Lash, S., and Urry, J. 1987. *The end of organized capitalism*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Lewis, P. 1990. *The crisis of Argentine capitalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Liernur, J., and Silvestri, G. 1983. Para un estudio de las relaciones entre tecnología y cultura. Buenos Aires, 1880-1930: El torbellino de la electrícidad. Buenos Aires (mimeo).

Lloyd, R. 1911. *Impressiones de la República Argentina de siglo XX*. London: Lloyd's Bank.

Lobato, M. 1988. *El "taylorismo" en la gran industria exportadora argentina (1907-1945)*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.

Lynch, J. 1981. *Argentine dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829-1852*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Martinez, A., and Lewandowski, M. 1915. *The Argentine in the twentieth century*. London: Fisher and Unwin.

Marx, K. 1968. *Theories of surplus value*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Massel, J.A. 1916. *Markets for machinery and machine tools in Argentina*. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Special Agents Series 116.

Oddone, J. 1936. *La burguesía terrateniente argentina*. Buenos Aires: Libera.

Panettieri, J. 1982. *Los trabajadores*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.

———. 1983. *Aránceles y protección industrial, 1862-1930*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.

Peters, H. 1934. *The foreign debt of the Argentine Republic*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Pianetto, O. 1984. Mercado de trabajo y accion sindical en la Argentina, 1890-1922. *Desarrollo Economico* 24 (94):297-307.

Platt, D.C.M. 1972. *Latin American and British trade, 1806-1914*. London: A&C Black.

———. 1980. Dependency in nineteenth-century Latin America. *Latin American Research Review* 15 (1): 113-30.

———, and Di Tella, G. (eds.) 1985. *Argentina, Australia and Canada*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Puiggros, R. 1965. *Pueblo y oligarquía*. Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez.

Randall, L. 1978. *An economic history of Argentina*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Regalsky, A. 1986. *Las inversiones extranjeras en la Argentina, 1860-1914*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.

Rock, D. 1975. *Politics in Argentina, 1890-*

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

1930: The rise and fall of radicalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1987. *Argentina, 1516-1987.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Romero, L.A., and Sábato, H. 1986/7. Artesanos, oficiales, operarios: Trabajo calificado en Buenos Aires, 1854-1887. In *Annuario Segunda Época*, pp. 125-50. Rosario: Universidad Nacionál de Rosario.

Sábato, H. 1984. The wool trade and commercial networks in Buenos Aires, 1840s-1880s. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 15: 67-90.

Sábato, J. 1975. Notas sobre la formación de la clase dominante en la Argentina moderna. Buenos Aires: CISEA.

———. 1988. *La clase dominante el la Argentina moderna.* Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano.

Scalabrini, R. 1957. *Política Británica en el Rio de la Plata.* Buenos Aires: F. Blanco.

Scarzanella, E. 1981. L'industria argentina e gli immigranti italiani: nascita della borghesia industriale bonaerense. *Annali della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi* 15: 119-43.

Schvarzer, J. 1983. La implantación industrial. In *Buenos Aires, historia de cuatro siglos*, eds. J.L. Romero and L.A.Romero, Vol.II, pp. 135-76. Buenos Aires: Editorial Abril.

Schwartz, H. 1988. *In the dominion of debt.* Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Scobie, J. 1964. *Revolution on the Pampas: A social history of wheat, 1860-1910.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

———.1974. *Buenos Aires: Plaza to suburb, 1870-1910.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sharkey, E. 1977. Unión Industrial Argentina 1887-1920: Problems of industrial development. Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University.

Sinclair, K. 1969. *A history of New Zealand.* London: Penguin.

Sofer, E. 1982. *From Pale to Pampa: A social history of the Jews of Buenos Aires.* New York: Holmes and Meier.

Solberg, C. 1987. *The Prairies and the Pampas: Agrarian policy in Canada and Argentina, 1880-1930.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Tornquist, E. 1919. *The economic development of the Argentine Republic in the last fifty years.* Buenos Aires: Ernesto Tornquist.

U.S. Dept. of Commerce. 1910. *Shoe and leather trade in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

———. 1920. *The economic position of Argentina during the war.* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

von Motz, F. 1916. *Markets for agricultural implements and machinery in Argentina.* Washington, DC: Dept. of Commerce, Special Agents Series 125.

Waisman, C. 1987. *Reversal of development in Argentina.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Walter, R. 1977. *The Socialist Party of Argentina, 1890-1930.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Weil, F. 1944. *The Argentine riddle.* New York: John Day Co.

Williams, J.H. 1920. *Argentine international trade under inconvertible paper money, 1880-1900.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Worthington, P. [1899] 1980. *Condiciones y perspectivas del comercio británico en algunos paises de sudamericanos.* Reprinted in *Desarrollo Economico* 19 (76): 235-52.

This content downloaded from 115.124.85.178 on Wed, 21 Mar 2018 04:45:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms